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Abstract
Much human behaviour can be seen as decision-making, and so understanding and inuencing those
decision-making processes could be an important component in design for behaviour change. This
paper examines the `heuristics and biases' approach to modelling decision-making, and attempts
to extract insights which are relevant to designers working to inuence user behaviour for social
or environmental benet|either by exploiting biases, or helping to counter those which lead to
undesirable behaviour. Areas covered include a number of specic cognitive biases in detail, and
the alternative perspective of Gigerenzer and others, who contend (following Herbert Simon) that
many heuristics potentially leading to biases are actually ecologically rational, and part of humans'
adaptive responses to situations. The design relevance of this is briey considered, and implications
for designers are summarised.
1 Introduction
\A useful theory of rational thinking...ought to provide advice to people that they can follow.
It does no good to try to teach people by saying\Be correct!"or\Make good decisions!"That
is like telling investors to buy low and sell high: This advice only tells people what their goals
are, not how to achieve them. An appropriate response to such advice is, \Gee, thanks."
Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding, 2nd edition, 1994, p.36
Much human behaviour can be seen as decision-making, and so understanding and inuencing those
decision-making processes could be an important component in design for behaviour change. As Plous
(1993, p.xv) notes,\more research has been published on failures in decision making than on successes":
decision-making research is often about deviations from what is assumed to be rational choice, whether
these are framed as shortcomings in human reasoning, or as adaptive strategies. The area of decision-
making research focused on understanding heuristics and biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) arose in
particular from studying people's judgement under conditions of uncertainty, such as common subjective
assessments of probability, but because of the wider societal implications of the eects uncovered, the
study has since developed into elds such as behavioural economics and, in recent years, gained signicant
political attention.
1What is a cognitive bias? It is assumed to be, essentially, a systematic bias in the outcomes of
decisions people make, arising from the application of one or more heuristics1: \rules of thumb" (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008, p.22) or \inference mechanisms" (Gigerenzer et al, 1999, p.vii)|simple `shortcut'
strategies for making decisions or judgements. For example, if we are in an unfamiliar city in the evening,
looking for somewhere to eat, a quick heuristic might be to go for a restaurant that looks popular, while
a more detailed heuristic might involve looking up information on the dierent restaurants in the city
and comparing relative distances, prices, and so on.
A number of heuristics involve attribute substitution of one form or another; \When confronted with
a dicult question people often answer an easier one instead, usually without being aware of the substi-
tution... A professor who has heard a candidate's job talk and now considers the question `How likely
is it that this candidate could be tenured in our department?' may answer the much easier question:
`How impressive was the talk?'...We will say that judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an indi-
vidual assesses a specied target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that
object|the heuristic attribute|which comes more readily to mind" (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002,
p.53).
2 Two cognitive systems
Some common heuristics and biases with relevance to design for behaviour change are outlined below,
but rst it is worthwhile examining the concept of the `two cognitive systems'. Much current cognitive
psychology research assumes a `dual process model' of brain functions (e.g. Chaiken and Trope, 1999;
Sloman, 2002): there are held to be two `systems' at work when we make decisions, the purpose of the
labelling from psychologists' perspective being to \distinguish cognitive operations that are quick and
associative from others that are slow and rule-governed" (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).
The way the two systems are characterised diers somewhat between researchers, but Evans (2008)
notes that \[a]lmost all authors agree on a distinction between processes that are unconscious, rapid,
automatic and high capacity, and those that are conscious, slow and deliberative." Stanovich and West
(2002, p.436) call the two systems System 1 and System 2; Kahneman and Frederick (2002) suggest the
terms Intuitive system and Reective system for Systems 1 and 2 respectively, while Thaler and Sunstein
(2008) use Automatic and Reective. Other terminology is also available (Evans, 2008).
In Kahneman and Frederick's explanation (2002, p.51),\System 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers
to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2 monitors the quality of those proposals, which it may
endorse, correct, or override. The judgments that are eventually expressed are called intuitive if they
retain the hypothesized initial proposal without much modication." The distinction between System 1
and System 2 also seems to have signicant parallels with Petty and Cacioppo's peripheral and central
route persuasion (1981; see Lockton, 2012a for its relevance to design). Sloman (2002, p.380-3) suggests
analogies with dierent kinds of computational principles: \Roughly, one system [1] is associative and
its computations reect similarity and temporal structure; the other system [2] is symbolic and its
computations reect a rule structure...When a response is produced solely by the associative system
[1], we are conscious only of the result of the computation, not the process. In contrast, we are aware of
both the result and the process in a rule-based computation [2]."
Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p.23) characterise heuristics and biases as\emerg[ing] from the interplay
between the Automatic System and the Reective System"|essentially, they arise when the Reective
1The wider denition of heuristics as \methods that are sometimes useful in solving a problem|useful enough to try
even when it is not clear that they will help" (Baron, 1994, p.70) derives from P olya's (1945) How to Solve It, a handbook
of mathematical techniques which will be discussed further (for its format, approach and relevance to design patterns) in
a forthcoming working paper.
2System (2) does not suciently adjust or correct erroneous intuitive judgments made by the Automatic
System (1). Kahneman and Frederick (2002, p.59) oer a perhaps more nuanced view, suggesting that
certain heuristics are deliberately employed by System 2, for example when unsure about a decision but
needing to make one (perhaps quickly) and lacking prior knowledge or reasoning|e.g. \when a voter
decides to evaluate candidates solely by their stance on a particular issue."
3 Design implications: exploiting and countering heuristics and
biases
From a design point of view, at least at this stage, debate over the two systems probably does not matter
too much: the question is about what can be usefully learned from studies on heuristics and biases in
terms of practical application in inuencing user behaviour. The question of where heuristics, biases
and cognitive systems t into designers' models of how people think and behave has been addressed
in Lockton, Harrison and Stanton (2012) via a study with a group of designers; of the three models
proposed there, one, the shortcut user, attempts to cover all shortcut-type heuristics and biases, whether
deliberately employed by users or not.
The next sections will outline a few of the cognitive biases and heuristics that have been `discovered',
and their potential relevance to, or application in, design for behaviour change. It does not seem essential
to distinguish between heuristics and biases themselves from a design point of view: they are either
eects which may be useful for design because they could be exploited to inuence people's behaviour,
or important because there is an opportunity to counter them to help people make better decisions (e.g.
Nisbett et al, 1982; Fischho, 2002), hence inuencing the desired behaviour. As Baron (1994, p. 47)
notes, \[i]t is, in a way...a cause for optimism to discover biases and irrationalities, for we can teach
people to avoid them." In some cases, both exploiting the bias and helping people to avoid it through
design may be appropriate in dierent situations.
While much research on heuristics and biases has arisen from studies of estimating probability, for the
designer this is not primarily the condition under which the eects will be used or countered: situated
interaction decisions (Suchman, 1987/2007) can make use of heuristics without assuming that the user
is assigning probabilities to the value of dierent actions. In some cases, the designer's scope to improve
decision processes may be simply about making functions and consequences `transparent' to allow users
to make more informed decisions: as Sloman (2002, p.380) notes,\[a] manipulation that reduces bias by
making an extensional probabilistic or logical relation transparent is in essence providing a representation
that aords rule-based inference, allowing people to go beyond associative reasoning."
3.1 Conrmation bias
One of the most fundamental biases identied is the conrmation bias: \potentially conrmatory evidence
is apt to be taken at face value while potentially disconrmatory evidence is subjected to highly critical
and skeptical scrutiny"(Ross and Anderson, 1982, p.149). That is, people have a tendency to overweigh
evidence that supports a point of view they already have, and not to search impartially for evidence that
might cause them to change their mind (Baron, 1994).
A way to counter this (potentially through design) is to direct people to think of evidence against
what they already believe, as part of a decision process|including some step where people are confronted
with the suggestion that there might be other points of view or consequences to consider. Wilson et al
(2002, p.197) suggest\asking people to `consider the opposite,' whereby they imagine dierent outcomes
than the ones they had been thinking about. Simply thinking about whether a specic hypothesis is true,
3for example, increases people's beliefs in its validity because the person focuses more on explanations as
to why it could be true than why it could be false".
3.2 Framing and loss aversion
Another fundamental concept is that of framing: the same situation, but presented, described or under-
stood dierently, can lead to dierent decisions being made. This may perhaps seem intuitively obvious
to designers, who are used to the importance of presentation, but it is worth recognising framing eects
as phenomena relevant to a variety of contexts, with the potential to be either exploited or corrected.
For example, Slovic et al (1982, p.91) report that reframing the statistics about the number of injuries
and deaths in road accidents from an `incidents per million person-trips' frame to a per-person lifetime
perspective (how likely an individual person is to be injured in a road accident over his or her life) led
to people \respond[ing] more favorably toward seat belts (and air bags)." It is easy to imagine similar
reframings of statistics around energy use, environmental impact, health-related behaviour, and so on,
potentially via designed interfaces giving feedback on behaviour.
A relatively simple reframing of the way the information is presented or thought about can aect
the way people make decisions. Research on mental accounting (e.g. Thaler, 1999) suggests that, for
example, framing money o as a rebate means it seems like a gift, whereas just reducing the price
of product by the same amount is less attractive. Baron (1994, p.390) suggests that \by segregating
outcomes at appropriate times, we can deceive each other|and even deceive ourselves|into thinking
that we are getting more for our money. One simple principle here for a seller (including the person
who wants to sell something to himself) is the motto Segregate the gains, integrate the losses. The late-
night television advertisements for kitchen utensils oer a long list of (segregated) gains from buying the
product, as does the car dealer who wants to add many options (for only a `small' additional cost)."2
Much of the research in this area emerged from trying to understand loss aversion, people's tendency
to prefer to take risks to avoid a loss, but avoiding risks to obtain a gain. Kahneman and Tversky's
prospect theory (1979) sought to explain how people deviate from the conventional economic expected-
utility model: the same quantity is valued as having greater magnitude when framed as a loss than when
framed as a gain. For example, if oered choice A: `an 80% chance of $4,000, a 20% chance of nothing'
or choice B: `a 100% chance of $3,000', more people choose B, the `certain' outcome (80% of participants
for this particular example in Kahneman and Tversky's study|using Israeli pounds) even though the
expected utility of A is $3,200 (i.e. 80% of $4,000) compared with B's $3,000.
Thaler (1980, p.45) notes that credit card company lobbyists in the US pressured retailers to frame
\any dierence between [prices charged to] cash and credit card customers...[in] the form of a cash
discount rather than a credit card surcharge. This preference makes sense if consumers would view the
cash discount as an opportunity cost of using the credit card but the surcharge as an out-of-pocket cost."
As Baron (1994, p.363) puts it,\by manipulating the reference point, we can make a subjective gain into
a subjective loss and vice versa."
3.2.1 Anchoring and arbitrary coherence
Numbers|especially prices|and products themselves can act as anchors, setting reference points for
what people expect to pay (or, potentially, how people expect to behave in general). Certain choices can
also be deliberate decoys, not intended to be chosen, but solely included to make the other choices look
more attractive in comparison,
2Poundstone (2010, p.15) notes that: \When Amos Tversky received a MacArthur grant in 1984, he joked that his work
had established what was long known to `advertisers and used-car salesmen.'"
4Ariely et al (2003) demonstrated an additional aspect of anchoring, which they term arbitrary coher-
ence|\although initial prices...are `arbitrary', once those prices are established in our minds they will
shape not only present prices but also future prices (this makes them `coherent')" (Ariely, 2008, p.26).
In the study, each participant was asked to write down the last two digits of his or her social security
number (from 00 to 99), and then `bid' on various products (wine, a cordless keyboard, some chocolates,
etc). The results showed that participants with the highest-ending social security number digits bid sig-
nicantly higher than participants with lower numbers. \[S]tudents with social security numbers ending
in the upper 20 percent placed bids that were 216 to 343 percent higher than those of the students with
social security numbers ending in the lowest 20 percent" (Ariely, 2008, p.28).
The size labels used by coee shops such as Starbucks have been cited as designed to be strategically
framed (e.g. Everything2.com discussion, 2001-5): Starbucks' menu starts with a `Tall' as its smallest
size, shifting the reference point for comparing sizes. The suggestion is that framing the size range `up'
the scale avoids `mediocre' implications for any of the sizes, and avoids suggesting a `loss' for the smaller
sizes. By starting with Tall, every larger size oers a `gain'. Just (2011) has investigated aspects of this
via a study in a university cafeteria, nding that size labels did not seem to inuence people's willingness
to pay in the way prospect theory might suggest, but that people do seem to use size labels as\objective
information about the size of the portion|even though the food was clearly visible" (p.11).
3.2.2 Applications in design
Framing|or reframing|can be seen as covering a huge range of practices and techniques: anything
which shifts people's reference points (including anchoring and decoy eects) or presents a situation or
choices dierently (Thaler and Sunstein's choice architecture (2008)). From the design for behaviour
change perspective, it is probably worth considering reframing as an approach relevant to any situation
where it is possible to elicit a dierent point of view or behaviour by restructuring the way information
is presented, particularly if the reframing can take into account loss aversion.
In an environmental application, Yates and Aronson (1983, p.438) note that many \informational
campaigns stressing the amount of money and energy that can be saved by investing in alternative
energy sources and conservation devices encourage people to dene this as a gain or win situation," but
that taking loss aversion into account,\this labeling may function as a deterrent to the acceptance of the
new technology or behavioural practice."They recommend a reframing|\[home energy] auditors should
focus on showing residents how much they are losing every month by not investing in alternative energy
sources and conservation measures... People may not go out of their way to save money, but it appears
that they are willing to act to avoid losing it."3
Following this argument, framing a suggestion of closing the oce blinds or curtains at night before
going home as \Every bit of heat lost means a smaller bonus this year!" is perhaps more likely to be
eective than \Close the curtains and have a larger bonus!" Equally, where a system can give users
feedback it makes sense, if possible, to frame this in terms which are known to have most impact on
particular users|if it is known that a certain group of users cares more about money than about the
environment, frame the feedback in terms of nancial costs, whereas for others, feedback framed in
terms of environmental impact (or social benet) might be more appropriate. User segmentation may
be relevant here in terms of deciding which way to frame the feedback.
3A comparison of the eectiveness of framing energy use behaviour change as being about avoiding wasting energy
rather than saving energy is something the author intends to pursue in a future study.
53.3 Status quo bias, defaults, opt-ins and opt-outs
\[I]f, for a given choice, there is a default option|an option that will obtain if the chooser
does nothing|then we can expect a large number of people to end up with that option,
whether or not it is good for them."
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge, 2008, p.84
There is an asymmetry between the `present state' in any situation, and a change in behaviour: the
present state, the status quo, is more likely to be taken as the reference point (Samuelson and Zeckhauser,
1988), and deviations from this regarded as riskier, less desirable, or simply too much eort. Whether
defaults are consciously designed into systems|from interfaces to pension schemes|or \established via
historical precedent, perceptual salience, conspicuousness, or some other feature that qualitatively dis-
tinguishes one option from the rest" (Frederick, 2002, p.555), their existence can lead to a bias towards
omission (as opposed to commission), not changing behaviour (or not doing anything at all). Frederick
(2002) suggests that even if not planned as a `status quo' option, defaults can arise simply as `focal
points' in a system, using Schelling's (1960) concept.
3.3.1 The power of defaults
Kesan and Shah (2006, p.587) examine the importance of defaults in software, from a legal perspective
as well as a behavioural economic one. They give the example of the default home page of the Netscape
browser, in the context of AOL's $4.2 billion acquisition of Netscape in 1998: \the most valuable part
of Netscape was not its software, but its default setting for its home page. Because a large number
of users (estimated at forty percent) never changed this default setting, Netscape's home page had
enormous popularity."4 Shah and Sandvig (2005), in a survey of 375,000 wireless routers in the US,
found that \when a manufacturer sets a default setting [such as encryption settings] this produces 96-
99% compliance"|something which potentially has legal implications where unencrypted wireless access
is `open' by default, yet the router owner may be found liable for any illegal activity committed by others
using the access point.
The implication here is not only that people stick with default settings, but that they may not even
realise that they are settings at all: they are presented to the user as a fait accompli. \If a person does
not know about the possibility of changing an option or the ramications of each choice, then a default
setting is equivalent to a xed setting" (Kesan and Shah, 2006, p.601).
Apple's Human Interface Guidelines (Apple, 2009, p.241), as used to dene the design of application
graphical user interfaces by developers writing for Mac OS X, specically recommend a very cautious
approach to using defaults:
\Usually the rightmost button or the Cancel button is the default button. The default button
should be the button that represents the action that the user is most likely to perform if that
action isn't potentially dangerous. A default button has color and pulses to let the user know
that it is the default. When the user presses the Enter key or the Return key, your application
should respond as if the user clicked the default button.
Don't use a default button if the most likely action is dangerous|for example, if it causes a
loss of user data. When there is no default button, pressing Return or Enter has no eect; the
user must explicitly click a button. This guideline protects users from accidentally damaging
4With similar reasoning, from 2011|2014, Google is paying the Mozilla Foundation around $300 million a year in
royalties for Google to be the default search engine in the Firefox browser (Swisher, 2011).
6their work by pressing Return or Enter. You can consider using a safe default button, such
as Cancel."
This last point|the \user must explicitly click a button" recommendation|is paralleled by Thaler and
Sunstein's (2008) concept of `required choice' or `mandated choice': removing defaults entirely to make
sure that someone actively chooses something rather than simply going with the default. Thaler and
Sunstein's recommendations on using a mandated choice question on organ donation on driving licence
renewal forms (2008, p.180)|the question would have to be answered and could not be skipped|appear
to have been adopted in a modied form by the UK's Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (BBC
News, 31 December 2010), under the slightly friendlier title of `prompted choice'. Baron (1994, p.507)
suggests \ask[ing] what would be chosen if there were no status quo," i.e. prompting people to think
about what they would choose to do if there were no default or existing pattern of behaviour.
3.3.2 Opt-ins and opt-outs
Johnson and Goldstein (2003) also examined the eects of defaults (and framing) on organ donation, in
particular the concept of presumed consent, and the notion of opt-ins and opt-outs. In countries with
presumed consent for organ donation, such as Austria and France, the default is that organs are donated:
someone must explicitly opt out of the scheme. In Austria, just 0.02 percent of the population chooses
to opt out. In other countries such as the UK and Denmark, explicit consent is required: someone must
opt-in to the scheme, the default being that organs are not donated. In Denmark, only 4.25 percent of
the population chooses to opt in (the UK gure is around 17 percent).
Indeed, in Germany, an opt-in country, only 12 percent opt in, compared with 99.98 percent across
the border in Austria. Johnson and Goldstein ran an online study asking respondents whether they
would agree to be donors on the basis of one of three dierent conditions|opt-in, opt-out and a `neutral'
condition with no default. \In the opt-in condition, participants were told to assume that they had just
moved to a new state where the default was not to be an organ donor, and they were given a choice
to conrm or change that status. The opt-out condition was identical, except the default was to be a
donor. The third, neutral condition simply required them to choose with no prior default."(Johnson and
Goldstein, 2003, p.1338). The study found that donation rates for the opt-out condition (82 percent)
were nearly twice those for the opt-in condition (42 percent), while the neutral condition produced almost
identical results to the opt-out condition (79 percent).
Baron (1994, p.389) suggests an additional angle on the opt-in/out issue: framing the choice as being
about choosing or rejecting options, in order to\manipulate attention to positive and negative features...
We tend to choose options because of their positive features but reject them because of their negative
features."
3.3.3 How to use defaults
Goldstein et al (2008, p.102) oer a `decision tree for setting defaults', published in the Harvard Business
Review. The idea is to\help companies design defaults that align with customers' preferences and support
good decisions,"making use of a number of categories of defaults with dierent characteristics. The basic
distinction is between `personalised defaults' (where defaults can be tailored to individual customers or
users), and `mass defaults' (where they cannot). The sub-categories of mass defaults are: hidden options
(where a single choice is presented as not just the default, but the only option); benign defaults (a kind
of `best guess' default acceptable to most customers); forced choice (Thaler and Sunstein's mandated
choice|see above); and random defaults (where customers are assigned dierent defaults randomly).
7Goldstein et al note that \The U.S. government... relied on random defaults in assigning senior
citizens to one of many prescription drug plans. That default strategy had its critics, but others like
it can be useful when an organisation lacks information about individual or majority preferences, feels
that none of the conguration options is the clear benign choice, and believes that none would cause
harm"(p.103). In the personalised defaults branch, the sub-categories are: persistent defaults (based on
knowing a customer's past preferences; smart defaults (based on demographic or market segmentation
data); and adaptive defaults (based on real-time usage decisions). Each category has advantages and
disadvantages in dierent contexts; while focused on business contexts, the decision tree potentially oers
a useful guide for designers too.
People will often choose whatever option is easiest, or looks correct, and so careful redesign of choices
to make the most ecient one the default has the potential to be eective. McCalley (2006) removed the
default temperature settings from a washing machine interface, giving users 0￿C as a new starting point,
and found a 24% reduction in electricity use over 20 washing trials compared with a control group using
the manufacturer's pre-programmed settings. If the options are available, and easy for users to select, it
is more likely that they will be used. Where energy-using appliances have multiple possible energy use
modes or settings (e.g. a refrigerator with adjustable temperature, or a washing machine with a number
of dierent wash cycles), the system could default to the mode which uses the least energy, and thus
require users to make an explicit choice to deviate from this.
Depending on the complexity of the system, a context-based approach may be more appropriate, to
reduce the likelihood of a too-low setting (e.g. a short 30￿C wash cycle applied to heavily stained clothes)
giving poor results, leading to frustration. If there is no default mode, simply making the least energy
mode more prominent or easy to select is an alternative that can be accomplished simply by redesigning
the user interface (equally, making energy-intensive modes more dicult to select may achieve the same
result). Devices where unnecessary (excessive) energy and water use are very common, such as electric
kettles, could require users to make a choice about the amount of water that needs to be heated before
starting, as on the Eco Kettle (Product Creation Ltd., n.d.) or heat only one unit quantity at a time, as
on the Tefal QuickCup (Tefal UK Ltd., n.d.) .
One problem with attempts to encourage people to change default settings or actively make choices
where previously they did not have to is the risk that if it `goes wrong', the eects will be felt more
(a corollary of loss aversion). Kahneman and Miller (1986, p.354-5) propose \a hypothesis of emotional
amplication that states that the aective response to an event is enhanced if its causes are abnor-
mal... the same undesirable outcome is judged to be more upsetting when the action that led to it was
exceptional than when it was routine."
3.4 Salience biases and the availability heuristic
Salience biases derive from ndings that\colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionately
engage attention and accordingly disproportionately aect judgments" (Taylor, 1982, p.192). This is
perhaps intuitively true to designers, at least in terms of engaging attention. Explicit applications of
colours for this purpose are numerous, but other dynamic stimuli have also been used, such as Ju and
Sirkin's (2010) study using an information kiosk with a physical waving hand, gesturing to passers-by to
interact with the kiosk. The waving hand inuenced twice as many people to interact with the kiosk as
did an on-screen animation of a waving hand. While it would be possible to see a novelty eect at work
here, the technique was eective in the intended context.
The availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) deals with how people's estimates of the
probability of an event (or the size of a class) are inuenced by how easily characteristics or examples
come to mind (how `available' they are). \For example, one may assess the divorce rate in a given
8community by recalling divorces among one's acquaintances... and one may estimate the probability
that a violent person will `see' beasts of prey in a Rorschach card by assessing the strength of association
between violence and beasts of prey" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, p.164). Salience is considered as
an important factor in establishing availability: \the impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective
probability of such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading about a re in the local
paper" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p.11). The implication for designers is that if we want an idea
(or the idea of a behaviour) to be `available' for people to consider (not just in a probability sense, but
in terms of familiarity), making it salient in some way is a sensible step.
3.4.1 Applications of salience to inuencing more sustainable behaviour
Salience and the availability heuristic probably have some eect on people's estimation of the energy
used by dierent everyday systems, and the behaviour changes they believe are worthwhile making. For
example, a major survey by Attari et al (2010) found that\most participants mentioned curtailment (e.g.,
turning o lights, driving less) rather than eciency improvements (e.g., installing more ecient light
bulbs and appliances)" as the most eective strategies they could think of for saving energy; the energy
used by equipment where energy use is `invisible', such as air conditioners, space heaters and clothes
dryers was underestimated, while the energy used in lighting|a `visible' context|was more accurately
estimated.
Without thinking or understanding too much about energy use, people overestimate the energy used
by some appliances where it is very visible (e.g. lighting) compared with invisible uses such as air
conditioning (Kempton & Montgomery 1982, cited in Lutzenhiser 1993). This immediately suggests
redesigning devices to incorporate obvious, vivid displays of energy use: increasing the salience of energy
use in contexts where it is currently lacking. This could be feedback on actual energy use (see Lockton,
2012b) or simply a reminder that energy is being used|an ultra-simple kind of feedback.
A series of innovative projects from the Interactive Institute in Sweden (e.g. Maz e and Redstr om,
2008) have focused on exactly this salience aspect: increasing awareness of energy use by displaying
it vividly and memorably, for example: the Power Aware cord (Gustafsson and Gyllensw ard, 2005), a
load-proportionally illuminated electrical extension lead where\the intention was to make a user, to some
extent, perceive the light as the actual electricity"(Backlund et al, 2006, p.7); the Element (Backlund et
al, 2006), a 2kW electric heater using an array of 60W incandescent light bulbs to display very vividly the
energy used; and the Energy aware Clock (Broms, 2011, p.35-6), which \visualizes the daily electricity
rhythms of the household" by drawing around a 24-hour clock face|\a new kind of energy display that
would borrow the connotations of a normal kitchen clock|glanced at regularly throughout the day|in
order to make electricity use more concrete in relation to ordinary activities as well as to be a tool that
can encourage discussions about electricity consumption in the home." A number of these projects go
further than increasing general awareness of energy use into providing new kinds of more vivid feedback
beyond simply numbers and conventional graphs.
It could be that a display `translates' all environmental impact into some single vivid shortcut `meas-
ure' which is intended to have an emotional impact on users, such as Shiraishi et al's EcoIsland game
(2009), which \visualises the user's current eco-friendly behaviour as an island shared by his/her family
members," with the island sinking (apparently a powerful metaphor in Japan) if the family does not
work together to reduce their CO2 impact. A trial with six families led to increases in environmental
awareness but not signicant changes in actual behaviour. In this context, Wilson & Dowlatabadi (2007)
note that\emphasising one particularly salient or emotional attribute may inuence a decision more than
providing information on all attributes."
Dillahunt et al (2008) similarly used an emotionally engaging Flash-based `virtual polar bear' standing
9on a shrinking (or growing) ice oe to represent the total eects of participants' (self-reported) envir-
onmentally responsible behaviour (selected from a list of commitments); the number of commitments
fullled by participants who interacted with the polar bear was greater than for a control group.
There is certainly a risk here of oversimplication, of conating unrelated environmental behaviours
and impacts into a `measure' which is nothing of the sort, without educating users about anything deeper,
but it may be that a highly salient, perhaps emotionally engaging shortcut can be appropriate for some
users, along the lines of Tamagotchi and other virtual pets.
3.5 Serial position eects
Serial position eects describe biases where a person overweighs or underweighs evidence based on the
order in which it is presented. As Baron (1994, p.283) notes, \[w]hen the order in which we encounter
two pieces of evidence is not itself informative, the order of the two pieces of evidence should have no
eect on our nal strength of belief. Or, put more crudely, `When the order doesn't matter, the order
shouldn't matter.'" Nevertheless, order can matter. Primacy eects (the earlier a piece of information
is presented, the more inuential it is) and recency eects (the more recently a piece of information is
presented, the more inuential it is) have both been demonstrated (e.g. Asch, 1946; Murdock, 1962).
3.5.1 Primacy
Asch's investigation of what he called \the factor of direction" involved reading to participants two lists
of adjectives describing a man, and then asking them for an evaluation of his personality; the two lists
comprised the same words, but in reverse order. So one list started with intelligent and ended with
envious, while the other started with envious and ended with intelligent. Comparing the personality
assessments|even when written by the same participants|showed a tendency for the earlier adjectives
in each list to dominate the assessment. \The accounts of the subjects suggest that the rst terms set up
in most subjects a direction which then exerts a continuous eect on the latter terms. When the subject
hears the rst term, a broad, uncrystallized but directed impression is born. .The next characteristic
comes not as a separate item, but is related to the established direction. Quickly the view formed acquires
a certain stability, so that later characteristics are tted|if conditions permit|to the given direction"
(Asch, 1946, p.271-2).
Baron (1994, p.285) suggests that this kind of primacy eect may involve people (unwittingly or
otherwise) making \some commitment to the belief suggested by the earliest evidence they receive. If
they simply note the evidence and its implications, without forming a desire that its implications be
true, they may remain open-minded until all of the evidence is in."
Some design-relevant research on the eect of ordering candidates on ballot papers has suggested a
strong primacy eect, e.g. Koppell and Steen (2004, p.267), who found that \[i]n 71 of 79 individual
nominating contests [for the 1998 Democratic primary in New York City], candidates received a greater
proportion of the vote when listed rst than when listed in any other position. In seven of those 71
contests the advantage to rst position exceeded the winner's margin of victory, suggesting that ballot
position would have determined the election outcomes if one candidate had held the top spot in all
precincts."
3.5.2 Recency
Recency eects are more generally associated with information still being held in people's short-term
working memory; Miller and Campbell (1959) compared the two eects via ordering sections of some court
proceedings (arguments for the plainti, and arguments for the defence) in eight dierent ways, including
10introducing delays between arguments and/or after both arguments had been presented. The conclusions
suggest that when arguments are presented one after the other, and then there is a delay before their
evaluation, the primacy eect dominates|the earlier argument is weighed more highly|while when
there is a delay between arguments being presented, and then the evaluation occurs straight after the
second argument, the recency eect dominates|the later argument is weighed more highly. As Plous
(1993, p.44) points out, this suggests that \[i]f you are oered the choice of speaking rst or last in a
public debate, you should speak rst if the other side will follow you immediately and there will be a
delay between the debate and people's responses to it... On the other hand, if some time will separate
the two communications, and people will be asked to act immediately after the second presentation, you
should capitalize on the recency eect and choose to go last."
The implications for design can be relatively straightforward: Lidwell et al (2003, p.178) suggest that
designers should\[p]resent important items at the beginning or end of a list (versus the middle) in order
to maximize recall." A debiasing strategy from a design point of view might be to randomise the order
in which choices are presented, as Microsoft was required to do by the EU Competition Commissioner
in 2009 with the choice of web browsers oered to users to settle an anti-trust suit (Wauters, 2010).
3.6 Cialdini's `weapons of inuence'
Robert Cialdini (1984/2007) oers a set of six `weapons of inuence'|techniques for inuencing behaviour|
distilled from heuristics and biases research, other areas of psychology, and Cialdini's own experiences
(he spent three years\observ[ing], from the inside, the techniques and strategies most commonly and ef-
fectively used by a broad range of compliance practitioners"(2007, p.xii) such as salespeople, fund-raisers
and advertisers).
Each of Cialdini's `weapons' is explained via practical examples, from Tupperware parties to used-car
sales, and is oered both as a technique for potential use in business or personal life by the reader, and as
something of an education in persuasion literacy, to help the reader become more familiar with techniques
which he or she may experience when others are trying to exert behavioural inuence. The practical
nature of the techniques makes them eminently easily applicable in design contexts, as summarised in
Table 1, and evinced by Cialdini's role as Chief Scientist to the energy billing innovation startup Opower.
As such, patterns based on them could form a good core for an inspiration guide dealing with heuristics
and biases.
4 An alternative perspective: ecological rationality
\Casual observation suggests that people's judgment is generally `good enough' to let them
make it through life without getting into too much trouble"
Baruch Fischho, `Debiasing', in Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (eds.), Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, 1982, p.422
\The best kind of thinking, which we shall call rational thinking, is whatever kind of thinking
best helps people achieve their goals"
Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding, 2nd edition, 1994, p.29
Following the discussion of cognitive biases and heuristics, it is important to consider an alternative per-
spective on rationality and behaviour. The behavioural economics perspective developed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974), Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and others is often characterised as presenting humans as
essentially awed, less-than-rational creatures whose cognitive biases lead us into sub-optimal behaviour,
11Table 1: Cialdini's (2007) six `weapons of inuence', with possible design implications.
technique description possible design implications
Reciprocation People feel indebted|obliged to
reciprocate in some way|when someone
appears to do them a favour, even if they
did not ask for the favour in the rst
place. Cialdini (2007, p.22-24) discusses
the Hare Krishna fundraising tactic of
pressing `gifts' such as a book or a ower
into the hands of passersby, with the aim
of provoking a reciprocal response such
as a donation.
If designing systems which depend on
sharing, or will work better if users
contribute, design the interface to
encourage reciprocation. Give users
something up-front, perhaps
unexpectedly. Can involve `guilting' the
user, but is best if the user genuinely
wants to return a favour.
Example: Azureus (now Vuze), a
BitTorrent client, encourages users to
`reciprocate' for having downloaded a le
by continuing to seed it.
Commitment &
consistency
Explained either by cognitive dissonance
or self-perception theory (see Lockton
2012a for relevance to design), the
commitment & consistency bias describes
people's \nearly obsessive desire to be
(and to appear) consistent with what we
have already done"(Cialdini, 2007, p.57).
This can be exploited via `foot in the
door' techniques which gradually escalate
small commitments into much larger
behaviours.
Design your system to get users to
commit in some way to an idea or goal
(perhaps a small one initially) as part of
a process; they are then more likely to
behave in accordance with this to appear
or feel `consistent'.
Example: Voluntarily choosing to have a
water meter installed can demonstrate
some commitment to reducing water,
which may persist as a household tries to
remain consistent with the commitment.
Social proof See forthcoming working paper on social factors in design for behaviour change
Liking People are more likely to be persuaded
or inuenced by people that they like.
\Despite the entertaining and persuasive
salesmanship of the Tupperware
demonstrator, the true request to
purchase the product does not come
from this stranger; it comes from a friend
to every woman in the room...
[Customers] buy from and for a friend
rather than an unknown salesperson"
(Cialdini, 2007, p.168).
Make use of people's friends or gures
and personalities that they like to deliver
persuasive messages, or cultivate a
product or brand personality which is
likeable and friendly in order to inuence
users to behave in the ways suggested.
See also Carnegie (1936/1981) and
coverage of aective and emotional
design in Lockton (2012a).
Authority Using famous experiments such as the
Milgram obedience studies, Cialdini
discusses the use of `appeals to authority'
as a method of persuasion, in contexts
ranging from celebrity endorsement of
products (e.g. the \I'm not a doctor, but
I play one on TV" line (TV Tropes,
2011)) to the use of clothes (e.g. a
security guard's uniform) to trigger
`compliance' with requests.
Many users will behave as suggested by
an `authority gure' or expert even if
that behaviour is outside what they
would consider normal; systems can be
designed to make use of this eect.
Example: Much of Twitter's success at
engaging users to join and participate
was arguably due to well-publicised
`authority' gures and celebrities
embracing it at an early stage.
Scarcity The scarcity principle suggests that
\opportunities seem more valuable to us
when their availability is limited"
(Cialdini, 2007, p.238). Whether scarcity
is real or not in a situation, if it is
perceived to be, people may value
something more, and so alter their
behaviour in response.
Design systems strategically to
emphasise the scarcity of a resource.
Make use of loss aversion (see section
3.2), or introduce articial scarcity (e.g.
digital rights management).
Example: Digital fuel gauges showing
the remaining range on the current tank
can help concentrate drivers' minds on
the scarcity value of the fuel.
12and therefore need to be `xed' (via government policy, or from a design point of view, via designed
interventions).
From this perspective, the fact that humans are `boundedly rational' (e.g. Simon, 1955, 1972) is
a defect which often leads us to make bad decisions, for ourselves and for society, and needs to be
cured, \treat[ing] deviations from well-dened, consistent preference functions as correctable faults. If
individuals had decient (i.e., inconsistent, incomplete) preference functions, they were to be induced
to generate proper ones, perhaps through revealed preference techniques and education" (March, 1978,
p.594).
4.1 Heuristics as adaptive responses to situations
However, Gigerenzer, Todd and others (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Todd and Giger-
enzer, 2012) have put forward the view, drawing more closely on Simon's original descriptions of bounded
rationality, that our cognitive biases and the heuristics we use, including satiscing (Simon, 1956,
1969/1981), are in many cases adaptive|they are not sub-optimal, but actually very well optimised
given the time and processing constraints humans face in everyday life contexts. As Slee (2006, p.27)
puts it, choices are often our \best response" to the world and the actions of those around us.
Gigerenzer et al's (1999) `Adaptive Toolbox' describes a kind of pattern library of ecologically rational
`fast and frugal heuristics' people use when faced with dierent situations which require a choice to be
made.
For example, the recognition heuristic deals with situations where someone is asked to infer\which of
two objects has a higher value on some criterion (e.g., which is faster, higher, stronger)." The heuristic is
both fast and frugal to execute: simply,\[i]f one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer
that the recognized object has the higher value"(Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999, p.41). An example: a
group of college students in the USA, asked whether Detroit or Milwaukee has a larger population, gave
mixed answers, with only 60% choosing Detroit (the right answer). In Germany, however, students given
the same question had mostly not heard of Milwaukee, but had heard of Detroit|thus by having less
information, \a benecial degree of ignorance" (Gigerenzer, 2008, p.7) they were able to make a more
correct choice.
Gigerenzer's approach, by considering both `blades' of Simon's scissors (Simon, 1990), treats decision-
making as being determined both by cognitive processes and by the structure of the environment, and
thus potentially has much to oer designers, particularly in understanding users' decision-making with
products and interfaces. It is not dicult to imagine systems designed to make use of fast and frugal
heuristics as part of a process of inuencing behaviour|for example, the recognition heuristic would
suggest that giving people a choice they recognise as being similar to something they already know could
be a way of transitioning them to a desired new behaviour. Lockton, Harrison and Stanton (2012) explore
some further aspects of this approach in the context of modelling user behaviour, while Lockton (2012c)
develops the idea of uncovering and using `behavioural heuristics' as part of the user research phase of
design for behaviour change, modelling behaviour in terms of simple rules which could be matched to
particular Design with Intent patterns (Lockton, Harrison and Stanton, 2010a, 2010b)
4.2 Habits as procedural rationality
Baron (1994, p.502-3) suggests that \[w]ithout realizing that we are doing so, we set precedents for
ourselves... Practically every decision we make sets a precedent for the same decision in similar cases in
the future. In this way, we form policies for the various domains of our lives. At times, of course, we
think about these policies and change them. At any given time, however, we can be said to be following
certain policies whether we have thought about them or not." This, then, is often how `habits' arise.
13Many behaviours relevant to environmental and social impact are the result of habits formed over
time. Someone who gets into the habit of leaving a light on when leaving the room needs the new
behaviour (turning it o) to become a habit replacing it. Darby (2006) notes that\as a rule of thumb, a
new type of behaviour formed over a three-month period or longer seems likely to persist, but continued
feedback is needed to help maintain the change and, in time, encourage other changes,"citing a long-term
(3-year) trial of \more informative energy bills" in Oslo by Wilhite & Ling (1995), who found that their
improved bill design (with graphs comparing building users' energy use for the same months the previous
year, corrected for temperature, and practical tips on energy saving) led to 10% reductions in energy use
by the end of the third year.
In Wilhite & Ling's study, many participants who had reduced their energy use considerably were
unable to give specic explanations of how they had done it, other than that their habits had changed:
\When asked if they had done anything dierently, very few respondents volunteered any specic changes
until prompted by follow-up questions. Towards the end of the interviews, some people had remembered
a change, usually which had to do either with lighting or space heating habits. Our impression from the
interviews is that after three years the changes people made had become so routine that they had trouble
identifying them." It seems clear, then, that a design intervention which can easily become a habit, or
modify an existing everyday habit, could be eective.
Jackson (2005, p.36), referencing Simon (1957), notes that habits can be considered `procedurally
rational'|\cognitive scripts whose role is to reduce the cognitive eort required to make routine decisions
whose rationality (i.e. optimality from the perspective of self-interest) has already been determined. For
as long as these cognitive scripts serve the interests of rational decisions, they can in fact be regarded as
rational habits." This adds an additional design perspective to the consideration of habits: if a designed
system makes it easier for some actions to occur without imposing too much cognitive load, then it is
probably more likely to be able to establish those actions as habits.
5 Implications for designers
￿ Much human behaviour can be seen as decision-making, and so understanding and inuencing those
decision-making processes could be an important component in design for behaviour change.
￿ A range of heuristics and biases have been identied; it is possible to see a `design' application for
many of them. It does not seem essential to distinguish between heuristics (which may cause the
biases) and biases themselves from a design point of view: they are either eects useful for design
because they could be exploited to inuence people's behaviour, or because there is an opportunity
to counter them to help people make better decisions, hence inuencing the desired behaviour.
￿ Eects which may have signicance for design include the conrmation bias, framing, the status
quo bias (particularly in relation to defaults), salience biases and serial position eects. Cialdini's
`weapons of inuence' are six cognitive bias-related strategies for inuencing behaviour which are
particularly easy to consider applying in a design context.
￿ Alternatively, or in parallel, `fast and frugal' heuristics could be exploited via design: for example,
the recognition heuristic would suggest that giving people a choice they recognise as being similar
to something they already know could be a way of transitioning them to a desired new behaviour.
￿ Habits may arise over time simply through the precedent that one action sets for future ones. A
design intervention which can easily become a habit, or modify an existing everyday habit, could be
eective; equally, if a designed system makes it easier for some actions to occur without imposing
14too much cognitive load, then it is probably more likely to be able to establish those actions as
habits.
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